

An Ideal Speech Situation in Action:

p4cHawai'i and Miyagi beyond Deliberative and Agonistic Democracy

* TABATA Taketo • ** WERNER Griffin

Abstract :

The aim of this paper is to place philosophy for/with children (p4c), Hawaii-Miyagi style, in the context of deliberative and agonistic democracy to describe its theory and practice in greater depth. First, we examine the tension between p4c and deliberative democracy. We extract two core concepts out of Jürgen Habermas's deliberative democracy, namely, consensus building and ideal speech situations, and examine the differences and similarities between them and p4c. The ideal speech situation is resonant with p4c. In order to dispel the misconception that the ideal speech situation is unrealistic, Heidegger, who influenced this concept's formation, is referenced. Through textual interpretation we reveal that the ideal speech situation is ontological yet rooted in lived experience. In terms of consensus building, p4c is at odds with deliberative democracy. On that point, p4c resonates with William Connolly's agonistic democracy. We examine the differences between agonistic respect and the safety of p4c by considering agonistic respect as a cultivated civic virtue compared to safety which provides the ontological ground for such cultivation. The safety of p4c is an ontological prerequisite that makes deliberative democracy, agonistic democracy, and other forms of democracy possible. It is open to all possibilities. The conclusion of this paper is that this ontological dimension can be described and understood from the perspective of Zen. Drawing from Nishitani Keiji's conception of the standpoint of emptiness, we describe the safe situation in p4c, which we call the ideal speech situation in action.

Key words : consensus, ontological difference, lived experience, identity and difference, śūnyatā (emptiness, 空 Kū)

1. Introduction

Just before his death in 2010, Matthew Lipman wrote an article distilling his concerns about the state of philosophy for children (P4C) and its role in education. When speaking about the role of P4C in teaching ethics to young students, Lipman compares P4C to both Jürgen Habermas's ideal speech situation and John Dewey's thinking classroom, writing that "in many respects, the community of philosophical inquiry approximates the condition of an ideal speech situation" (Lipman, 2001, p. 12). He does this to show

how, in a P4C setting, practice and theory approach each other and "the spirit of educational inquiry that informs them at the same time comes to fully animate the children in the classroom" (Lipman, 2001, p. 12). That is, Lipman admits that P4C puts into lived practice the ideal of Habermas's ideal speech situation. Ann Margaret Sharp (2018) also admits that Habermas's theories play an important role in the theoretical foundations of the concept of "community of inquiry" in P4C (p. 249). But, in dialogue with Megan Jane Laverty, Sharp (2018) also mentions her concern with Habermas's rational idealism and argues

* Miyagi University of Education

* * University of Hawai'i at Mānoa

that P4C's openness to stories, anecdotes, asides, and tentative questions goes beyond argument and the conception of reason offered by Habermas (p. 125). For Lipman and Sharp, along with learning the art of argument, P4C is an embodied and lived activity which also includes the facial cues of children expressing, for instance, hunger, nervousness, and boredom in the classroom space.

While much of the literature on P4C, as it has been developed and inspired by Lipman and Sharp, engages with Dewey's work on education, a serious and critical engagement with Habermas's ideas on education and democracy is lacking. For instance, the recent *The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children* (2017), while engaging with Dewey's ideas, does not mention Habermas even once. While a genealogy of the ideas which inspired Lipman and Sharp's development of P4C certainly ought to emphasize the pragmatist tradition that leads from Peirce to Dewey, we contend that Habermas's work can open up new ways of conceiving of the potential power of P4C pedagogical practice (Cam, 2018, 30). Lipman and Sharp felt an affinity with Habermas's theory yet at the same time noticed an incongruity between Habermas's ideas and the way their practice of P4C was developing. Their affinity with Habermas is rooted in the conditions necessary for the community of inquiry, namely, Habermas's concept of the ideal speech situation, as well as the social possibilities of the community of inquiry in creating the conditions for a successful deliberative democracy. But the incongruity they felt was due to Habermas's rationalism and abstract idealism built into the concepts of the ideal speech situation and deliberative democracy. P4C, by

contrast, is more focused on the lived experiences of the individuals in the community, which can be rational but are also emotional and often irrational. That is, in Habermas's language, P4C is rooted in the lifeworld of the community and not in the abstract.

We, as practitioners of P4C, feel this same affinity and incongruity with Habermas. However, in this article, we aim to explore this tension by carefully considering the resonances and limitations of Habermas's theory with respect to P4C. Our interest in this tension is born out of philosophy for children Hawai'i (p4cHI), which was developed by Thomas Jackson starting in 1984 but is inspired by Lipman and Sharp's P4C.¹ Drawing from Habermas's key concepts and our experiences observing and participating in p4cHI communities in both Hawai'i and Miyagi Prefecture Japan (p4cHI-M), we argue that Habermas's theory can serve to phenomenologically describe the lived experience and practice of p4cHI-M in action. Despite Lipman and Sharp's incongruity with Habermas, an engagement with his ideas breeds new insights into the possibilities of p4c for democracy. While Dewey's and Habermas's conceptions of democracy and their influence on the development of p4c often emphasize a deliberative conception of democracy and the role of education to foster the public use of reason, we offer a conception of P4C influenced by Jackson's p4cHI and consider it in dialogue with agonistic democracy, a form of democracy developed by William Connolly, which emphasizes tension and disagreement rather than the goal of consensus. Despite Habermas's rationalist approach to democracy and education, and by emphasizing the Zen Buddhist influence on the development of Jackson's p4cHI, we

1 There is a conceptual difference which motivates the lower-case lettering of p4c in Jackson's version compared to Lipman and Sharp. For Jackson, p4c is rooted in what he calls "little p philosophy" compared to the Big P Philosophy content and activities which Philosophers in academia engage in. Little p philosophy refers to the set of beliefs we begin to acquire at birth which condition and limit our thinking through a particular language and culture as well as the activity of engaging with and questioning those beliefs through our innate sense of wonder (Jackson, *Philosophical Rules of Engagement*, 2013). When using 'p4c,' we refer to the tradition of philosophy for children in general, including Lipman & Sharp as well as Jackson. p4cHI refers to Jackson's development of P4C, which in turn refers to Lipman & Sharp's.

contend that conceptualizing p4c as an ‘ideal speech situation in action’ opens up new ways of thinking about what p4c can be beyond deliberative and agonistic forms of democracy.

2. The Path to Deliberative Democracy, or Does p4cHI get us anywhere?

In “Gentle Socratic Inquiry,” Jackson (2017) expresses a philosophical problem at the foundation of the theory and practice of p4cHI. He writes that, “although we aren’t in a rush to get anywhere, we do have an expectation that we will get somewhere” (p. 12). That is, the direction or goal of p4c is paradoxical. Where is somewhere? Will we get somewhere in particular, although we aren’t in a rush to get anywhere? Is there a place where we know we have reached the goal of p4c?

If the goal of p4c is consensus, then it fits well with deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is rooted in Habermas’s discourse ethics, which contains two central features. “The first is that participants are motivated by an interest in coming to a consensus based on reasons...The second is that discourse involves stringent conditions of dialogic equality: no one may be excluded; everyone has an equal right to speak, question, make assertions, and express needs and desires; no coercion either internal or external may be used to sway participants” (Allen & Mendieta, 2019, p. 94, our underline). Let’s carefully examine these two features of Habermas’s conception of deliberative democracy, starting with the second one, and consider their resonances with p4c.

The second core feature of deliberative democracy aligns with the values and practices of p4c pedagogy. Lipman and Sharp’s (2018) development of P4C was motivated by a political commitment to “freedom, open debate, pluralism, self-government and democracy” (p. 247). The practical reason and reflective inquiry and judgment necessary for the political practice of democracy requires the building of skills in communal dialogue and inquiry among individuals who then

are able to take an active role in shaping democratic society. And it is the practice of p4c which helps create the conditions for the realization of the ideal of equality in a democracy.

After studying with Lipman and Sharp, Jackson developed p4cHI, which was born in part out of the tensions involved in trying to implement P4C in the multicultural environment of Hawai‘i. For instance, the *Philosopher’s Pedagogy* (Makaiau & Miller, 2012) was used in an Ethnic Studies class at Kailua High School to help students work through the tensions and mitigate the violence between two communities of students who came together after graduating from their respective middle schools (Makaiau, 2017, p. 9). However, rather than practical reason and reflective judgment, which is at the core of the political practice of Lipman and Sharp’s P4C, Jackson’s p4cHI emphasizes the notion of safety over equality. In p4cHI, with its four pillars of community, inquiry, philosophy, and reflection, the building of “safety” and deepening of the relationships among the members of the community is considered most important (Jackson, 2017, pp. 6-7).

Safety refers to physical, emotional and intellectual safety, that is, freedom from violence, coercion, and the consequences of power hierarchies. For Jackson (2017), “All participants in the Community feel free to ask virtually any question or state any view so long as respect for all community members is honored” (p. 6). To maintain safety, teachers and facilitators are encouraged to develop “safety rules” which can be used to reinforce the spirit of safety during p4c, such as: “(1) the person with the ball is the speaker of the moment. That person, when finished, may pass the ball to whomever has a raised hand. (2) One always has the right to pass. (3) One also has the ‘right to invite.’ Any student with the community ball may toss it to someone who hasn’t spoken yet, inviting them to join with their thoughts” (Jackson, 2017, p. 9). Despite the idiosyncratic use of the community ball in p4cHI, the spirit of safety is nothing more than an expression of Habermas’s dialogical equality, that is, an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas und

Luhmann, 1982, S. 136). It is a situation “in which communication is not only not hindered by external contingent influences, but also not by constraints resulting from the structure of communication itself” (S. 137). This is the second core feature of deliberative democracy.

However, Habermas’s concept of ideal speech situation is often criticized for being abstract and limited in its ability to account for hierarchies of power within a community. For instance, Niklas Luhmann writes that, “dominance is also in the discourse-system structurally conditioned and therefore, in principle, inevitable” (S. 332). It’s simply the case that discussions in daily life, even in the classroom at school, are always in some sense dominated by someone such that the right to speak is not equal. Moreover, in real discussions, there is an inequality of knowledge between those who know and those who don’t, and an inequality of skill between those who are good at speaking and those who are not. As the name suggests, an ideal speech situation sounds like an ideal. However, we contend that the ideal speech situation which occurs in p4c practice is not an abstraction but a lived reality. But how should we understand such an incongruity? The key lies in how we understand the concept of ‘ideal.’

Habermas writes that, “the concept of ideal speech situation” is “not just a regulative principle in the Kantian sense” (S. 140). That is, it is not where we are heading, nor is it the goal at which we aim. Rather, “we must, with the first act of linguistic communication, always already make this assumption” (S. 140). The ideal speech situation is an ‘assumption’ and must ‘always already’ be presupposed by members in a dialogue in order to initiate speech acts. The terms ‘always already’ and ‘pre-suppose’ come from Martin Heidegger, but Habermas uses them slightly differently. This is an issue that previous studies have overlooked. Hence, a careful textual interpretation will be made here to clarify Habermas’s use of the terms and their relevance for our conception of an ideal speech situation in action.

In a debate with Luhmann in which Habermas sets forth the ideal speech situation, he explains it in the original German as follows:

— dann muß es sich bei dieser Idealisierung der Sprechsituation um einen Vorgriff handeln, den wir in jeder empirischen Rede, mit der wir einen Diskurs aufnehmen wollen, vornehmen müssen, und den wir mit Hilfe der Konstruktionsmittel, über die jeder Sprecher kraft kommunikativer Kompetenz verfügt, auch vornehmen können. Wie ist der Entwurf einer idealen Sprechsituation mit Hilfe der Sprechakte, die jeder kompetente Sprecher ausführen kann, möglich?

(Habermas und Luhmann, S. 136f., our underline)

For those familiar with Heidegger's original work, Habermas's German here is reminiscent of the terminology used in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. The underlined words, “Vorgriff...vornehmen” and “Entwurf” are clearly a diversion from Heidegger. “Vorgriff” is translated into English as “fore-conception” (Heidegger 1962, p.141). ‘Fore-’ is temporal and refers to “the fore-structure of understanding” (Heidegger 1962, p.141). “Entwurf” is translated into English as the “project” of “the being of Da-sein” (Heidegger 1962, p.136). Heidegger writes, “in projecting project throws possibility before itself as possibility, and as such lets it be” (Heidegger 1962, p.136).

So the German above can be translated into English as follows:

— then this idealization of the speech situation must be a fore-conception that we have to fore-have in every empirical speech with which we want to start a discourse, and which we can also fore-have with the help of the means of construction that every speaker has at their disposal by virtue of communicative competence. How is it possible to project an ideal

speech situation with the help of the speech acts that every competent speaker can perform?

The uniqueness of Habermas lies in the fact that he found the fundamental conditions for dialogue in projections with ontological temporality. The ideal speech situation is our co-project in the Heideggerian sense. The terms above, 'always already' and 'presupposed,' also describe the temporality of the ideal speech situation. Habermas also describes this assumption as "counterfactual" (Habermas und Luhmann, S. 140). In other words, the temporality to which the ideal speech situation belongs is not the temporality of the factual world in which the linguistic communication occurs. Rather, to understand the temporality of the ideal speech situation, it is necessary to consider it in light of Heidegger's concept of "ontological difference", that is, the distinction between ontic and ontological (Heidegger 1962, p. 31).

The distinction corresponds to the difference between Being (with a capital B) and being (with a lowercase b). For Heidegger, human beings, which he calls Dasein, are beings who have a special relationship to Being as such. We are beings who have the capacity to question Being itself. This questioning touches on the ontological, while our natural attitude is concerned with the ontic. For instance, when we desire, will, think, and discuss something, we are concerned with the ontic. In contrast, when we question the existence of desiring, willing, thinking and discussing itself, that is, when we bracket such questions from ontic considerations, the ontological field is opened, and we start to think in the ontological register.

The terms 'ideal' and 'counterfactual' must be understood ontologically, that is, with respect to Being. The ideal speech situation is presupposed or co-projected by the members of a dialogue ontologically and temporally. It is not represented, intended, or imagined behind or above an actual conversation; rather, it ontologically sustains the capacity for a safe horizon of dialogue on an equal footing in the first place. So, we call it 'ideal speech situation *in action*'.

As long as we have the 'competence' to communicate, we can project it into reality. When we project it, we are resolving to maintain ontologically a safe horizon, that is, in such a way that it transforms our human *Being*.

With respect to safety, our attitude is radically changed. We stop trying to force our opinions. We learn to listen to the voices of others and carefully examine their viewpoints as well as our own. We refrain from knee-jerk reactions to opinions that differ from our own, even if they offend us. We stop clinging to our own way of thinking and try to put ourselves in other people's positions as well. First and foremost, in a safe p4c circle, we calm our minds, as we are not in a rush to get anywhere. This transformation which occurs over time due to p4c practice demonstrates the way in which the ideal speech situation takes place in action.

3. The Path to Agonistic Democracy, or Does p4cHI get us nowhere?

Despite sharing the second core feature, p4cHI-M does not share the first core feature of deliberative democracy, reaching consensus through reasoning. We, p4cHI-M, are not oriented by or toward the building of consensus through dialogue, empirically or theoretically. An important part of p4c is not being in a rush, especially not being in a rush to learn reasoning skills in order to make good arguments or to reach a consensus. Insofar as much of the structure of schooling very much is *in a rush*, with things like set class periods, lunch bells, and various other time constraints, implementing p4c into a classroom curriculum is often met with a concern over how it can be implemented correctly and efficiently. But insofar as p4c is a pedagogical approach to education, a way of thinking and relating first and foremost, rather than a program or methodology, the "goal" of p4c is simply to do p4c. These can be simple activities like sitting still in a circle, making and passing a community ball, listening silently while students talk, or any activity which helps shift the center of gravity in the classroom

toward the students rather than the teacher, *and* it can also be a lively debate about life after death (Jackson, 2013, p. 106). The practice of p4c is not in a rush to get anywhere because there is no specific content or skill that p4c is interested in teaching students. Rather, p4c is a practice of thinking and relating together which may bring us to many places, including consensus, but is not fundamentally oriented toward any place in particular. In that sense, p4c gets us nowhere, but it is precisely in this place of no-place where the ethical and democratic practice of p4c occurs.

While Habermas's Deliberative Democracy uses rationality as a means to consensus regarding political issues, Agonistic Democracy, like p4cHI-M, is not goal oriented and instead maintains the tensions and disagreements involved in concrete democratic practice. As an alternative to deliberative democracy, agonistic democracy has developed with respect to a relational and collective conception of identity. While our identities are defined through both collectivities (Asian, American, white, otaku, teacher, etc.) and differences (black vs white, western vs asian, civilized vs barbaric, etc.), political practice often suppresses this paradox of identity and uses it to promote exclusivist universality rather than acknowledging the paradox and using it to negotiate pluralism and deep contingency (Connolly, 1991, pp. xiv-xv). Political theorists like William Connolly argue that, with respect to deliberative forms of democracy, tolerance, which flows from a deontological conception of ethics (such as the Christian Ten Commandments or Kant's categorical imperative), is not enough to adjudicate differences in politics problems today.

Instead, he proposes, firstly, agonistic respect, consisting of "a relation of connection across difference, [which] does not entail the consolidation of a majority identity around which a set of minorities is tolerated as satellites," because it is a more expansive civic virtue appropriate for the current world which often finds itself having to contend with multiple sources of ethics in the same political territory (p. xxviii). Secondly, agonistic democracy takes seriously the ways

in which existential concerns bear on public life and issues of identity. While Habermas's (1986, pp. 53-54) consensus driven democracy relegates existential concerns such as guilt, loneliness, sickness, death, and the need for salvation outside the realm of political theorizing simply because social and political theory can do nothing to overcome them, Connolly's (1991) agonistic democracy politicizes the connection between identity and existential concerns in order to mitigate the psychology of resentment which has come to define so much of contemporary political life (pp. 162-164).

Unlike consensus driven discussion, Connolly's first point regarding agonistic respect and his emphasis on pluralism resonates with the values of p4cHI-M. As quoted above, safety according to Jackson (2017) involves respect for all community members. Such a view of safety, however, is not merely about students feeling comfortable. Rather, what p4cHI-M does in practice, through its use of the Good Thinker's Toolkit and reflective process, creates the conditions for what Connolly calls agonistic respect rather than that of a community of mere like-minded thinkers.

As Jackson (2017) writes, "the goal is not to persuade anyone to any particular answer, but rather for everyone to reach a deeper understanding of the complexity of the issues involved and a greater ability to navigate among these complexities" (p. 7). Inquiry arises out of the questions and interests of the students rather than a preset content or issue that is imposed from the teacher or from some place outside the community. Safety requires genuine listening which involves allowing community members the time and space to express an idea with patience and without the assumption that expressing an idea implies that it is one's final standpoint on an issue. Ideally, in a mature community of inquiry, thoughts expressed in the community are raw, unfiltered, malleable, and open to "development" by "probing deeper" into them. The goal is not to get anywhere or accomplish anything but rather to create a space for genuine listening and, eventually, thoughtful critique (Jackson, 2017, 6).

Connolly's second point about the relationship

between existential concerns and public life also resonates with p4cHI-M. Rather than appeal to a consensus view, Connolly's (1991) conception of agonism considers respect for difference, or the respect Jackson implies in his definition of safety, as an agonistic respect, one which "is a civic virtue that allows people to honor different final sources, to cultivate reciprocal respect across difference" (p. xxvi). But even this 'respect for difference' isn't found in a common source either; rather, agonistic respect is a paradoxical respect which "carries the expectation that you may contest one another on the source of respect, particularly when one party insists that eligibility for respect itself requires you to accept the universal it affirms. It also includes the possibility that something said or done by others may nudge you to reinterpret your existential faith, or draw you toward conversion to another" (p. xxvii). In other words, if political disagreements are based on different faiths or foundational sources of meaning, then politics must also involve contesting those sources by opening oneself and others to multiple possible sources.

When we trace Connolly's discourse to this point, the difference between the safety of p4cHI-M and agonistic respect also becomes clear. Safety in p4cHI-M is not 'a civic virtue'. It is neither 'a virtue' nor 'civic'. As in the quote above, Connolly's civic virtue, that is, 'reciprocal respect across difference,' needs to be cultivated. But p4cHI-M does not have the objective of cultivating participants. While those citizens without civic virtue cannot practice agonistic respect, safety, by contrast, can be shared with everyone, including children. P4cHI-M's safety is an ideal speech situation in action, as Habermas says above, which 'we can also fore-have with the help of the means of construction that every speaker has at their disposal by virtue of communicative competence'. The safety that p4c dialogue maintains as its starting point is not agonistic. It is not combative or rooted in struggle but is rather peaceful, akin to nirvana (涅槃, Nehan).

By examining the similarities and differences

between deliberative and agonistic democracy, the position of p4cHI-M has become clearer. P4c dialogue begins by throwing ourselves together into a safe coexistence. The top priority of p4c is to jointly create and maintain a safe space and time. As long as the safe space is protected, participants can take any perspective and say anything. The dialogue itself develops its own integrity, deciding where the dialogue goes (Jackson, 2017, 11). The dialogue can end in consensus or it can maintain disagreement and reflect agonistic respect. No matter how controversial the dialogue becomes, the participants' hearts remain calm, because they are standing on the side of safety. In this sense, p4c helps us go beyond both agnostic and deliberative democracy. Safety in p4c doesn't replace agonistic or deliberative democracy as a regulative ideal but instead becomes the existential ontological "ground" from which democracy, or anything else, becomes possible. Safety in p4c is the practice of making a safe community, and it is the circularity of such a conception of safety which opens up infinite possibilities for contending with problems that emerge due to different interpretive frameworks among community members.

In p4c, the children are often sitting on the floor of the classroom. But the most important thing is that they are standing on the "ground" of safety. The place where they are standing is not an ontic real world, despite its existence. The standpoint of p4c may be described as a 'śūnyatā (nothingness /emptiness, 空 Kū)' that "is nothing other than the field of the Great Affirmation" (Nishitani, 1982, p. 131).

4. The Path to Overcoming Democracy, or is p4cHI a form of Zen practice?

For Jackson (2017), like Plato, philosophy begins in wonder, and it is our primal wonder which motivates us to think and question deeply from a young age (p. 4). In the traditional model of schooling, the wonderings of students are not centered; instead, students are expected to learn specific content and demonstrate

that knowledge through standardized testing. As a result, children are often inculturated to think that all questions have explicit and knowable answers explainable through the language and culture into which they were born. To combat this, p4cHI aims to get us back in touch with our primal wonder by cultivating a beginner's mind. Drawing from the work of Zen Buddhist Shunryu Suzuki (1970), p4cHI promotes an attitude of openness and eagerness, one in which one's mind is empty and thus ready to be filled with new knowledge and experiences (pp. 21-22). When one's mind is full of a particular framework for viewing the world, encountering someone with a different one, especially in the political arena, can lead to not only disagreement but existential crisis and resentment. Putting all kinds of frameworks, prejudices, and stereotypes in brackets helps us reach a beginner's mind and be in a position of safety. In a position of safety, I am a pure observer; I calmly observe myself and others, who I notice are influenced by a particular framework of thinking.

I, in a safe p4c community, observe my opinions as they are, without judging them, before they become concrete beliefs. I allow a framework to be a framework, prejudice to be prejudice, stereotypes to be stereotypes, and resentment to be resentment. Only when we become aware of our opinions as separate objects, as they are, can we examine them impartially and make a fair judgment and evaluation. The first thing is to let thoughts exist as they are. The word "letting it be" may sound idealistic or speculative, but it is a lived experience of the practice of p4cHI-M. This lived experience of allowing everything to be as it is is rooted in the Chinese concept of wu-wei, along with traditions of mindfulness and other meditative practices. Scholars attempt to describe it using ontic language and logic, but, since it's a lived practice, such attempts often fail. Description can only go so far. So instead, we will use Nishitani Keiji's philosophy of emptiness to point at the lived dynamic we are attempting to describe with language and logic.

Japanese philosopher Nishitani, who studied

under Heidegger, turned Heidegger's existentialism on its head through Zen thought. Conversely, he also refined Zen thought philosophically. We will discuss Nishitani's "circuminsessional relationship (回互の關係)" in order to contrast it with Connolly's 'reciprocal respect across difference'. Nishitani describes circuminsessional relationship as follows:

That beings one and all are gathered into one, while each one remains absolutely unique in its "being," points to a relationship in which, ... all things are master and servant to one another. We may call this relationship, which is only possible on the field of śūnyatā, "circuminsessional."

(Nishitani, 1982, p. 148)

The relationship of "all things are master and servant to one another" does not mean that master and servant take turns with each other, but rather that "something in the position of master to other things can at the same time stand in the position of servant to all other things"; in other words, a relationship where something is master "at the same time" as it is servant, which "to our ordinary way of thinking, though, it is simply a contradiction" (Nishitani, 1982, p.147). This contradictory relationship helps describe the relationship of safety in p4cHI-M. In the safe circle of p4c, that is, in the ideal speech situation in action, we are mutually unique and equal. We did not learn this reciprocity from anywhere. We simply turn to this mode of existence through our own competence. In a safe circle, when I listen to other people's opinions, I give the center to the other person. However, I do not abandon my position. I allow others' positions to exist as they are, while allowing my position to exist as it is. As Nishitani (1982) describes, "this way that everything has of being on the home-ground of everything else, without ceasing to be on its own home-ground, means that the being of each thing is held up, kept standing, and made to be what it is by means of the being of all other things" (p. 149). Here,

I am the master and the servant at the same time, and there is no contradiction. Rather, this is a feeling that fits in well with our experience of communicating in a safe p4cHI-M circle.

This feeling becomes even more apparent when one is the listener rather than the speaker. In particular, when one feels the urge to react to what the other person is saying, you should remember the p4c rules and restrain that reaction. We often see children who can't control their reactions, but the ones we see most often are teachers who overreact. The key to making p4c work in the classroom often involves teachers refraining from reacting to children's thoughts. This is often the most difficult thing for teachers, who are caught between the desire to center student thinking and the constraints imposed on them by the school culture.

When one tries to control their automatic reactions, they experience a conflict within themselves. This is a struggle between two aspects of the self: the self that wants to react and the self that observes and restrains that reaction. These two selves exist simultaneously. The former belongs to the realm of reality, while the latter takes the standpoint of emptiness. The self that seeks to react is impulsive and heated, while the self that observes and restrains remains calm and cool-headed. If one abandons this standpoint of emptiness, by interrupting the other person or insisting on expressing one's own thoughts, the rules of p4c are broken. If one monopolizes the conversation and steers the discussion toward the conclusion they desire, they continue to violate the rules of p4c. In doing so, one becomes, as Luhmann points out, immersed in the reality governed by the principle of "domination." At this point, one is no longer living in a circuminsessional relationship with others.

The moments when I am about to break the rule of safety yet become aware of this and restrain myself from doing so, are precisely the moments when the essence of safety and what it means to uphold it become apparent. From these moments, it becomes clear that safety does not reside in my tangible, personal mind

but exists on the standpoint of emptiness, detached from my own mind, and instead between and among the community members in the p4cHI-M community.

Of course, my awareness of safety is not limited to moments when I hold back my automatic reactions. I can also be conscious of safety when listening to someone speak or when I am speaking myself—in other words, I can remain aware of the standpoint of emptiness and continue to ground myself in it. Furthermore, the awareness and practice of safety strengthened through p4c dialogue can extend beyond the dialogue itself to all aspects of life and various social systems. As an awareness and practice of the standpoint of emptiness, it represents a new way of being, one which is not limited by teleological logic of either deliberate or agonistic democracy.

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活動している理想的発話状況

ー討議／論争デモクラシーを超える子どもの哲学 (p4c) ハワイとみやぎー

田 端 健 人・ワーナー グリフィン

要 旨

本稿の目的は、子どもの哲学ハワイ・みやぎスタイル (p4cHI-M) を、討議デモクラシーと論争デモクラシーの文脈に位置づけ、p4cHI-M の理論と実践を深く掘り下げ、記述することである。まず、p4cHI-M と討議デモクラシーの緊張関係を検討した。ハーバーマスに由来する討議デモクラシーの2つのコア概念を、「合意形成」と「理想的発話状況」として抽出し、p4cHI-M との相違点と共通点を検討した。理想的発話状況は p4cHI-M と共鳴する。理想的発話状況が非現実的であるという誤解を解くために、この概念形成に影響を与えたと推測されるハイデガーを参照した。テキスト解釈により、それは存在論的で生きられた経験であることが明らかになった。合意形成という点では、p4cHI-M は討議デモクラシーと対立する。この点で、p4cHI-M はコノリーの「論争デモクラシー」と共鳴する。両者の重なりを述べた後、論争デモクラシーのアゴニスティック・リスペクトと p4cHI-M のセーフティとの違いを検討した。アゴニスティック・リスペクトは市民的美徳として涵養されるものであるのに対し、p4cHI-M のセーフティは言語能力のある者ならだれでも有する資質・能力であり、涵養の必要がないことが判明した。p4cHI-M のセーフティは、討議／論争デモクラシー、その他の民主主義の諸形態を可能にする存在論的前提である。それはあらゆる可能性に開かれている。本稿の帰結は、この存在論的次元は禅の観点から記述し理解できるという仮説である。試みとして、私たちは西谷啓治の空の立場から、私たちが「活動している理想的発話状況」と呼ぶ、p4cHI-M のセーフな対話状況を存在論的に記述した。

Key Words : 合意形成, 存在論的差異, 生きられた経験, アイデンティティと差異, 空 (Kū)

